We evaluate the long-run sustainability of health spending growth. Under the criterion that non-health consumption does not fall, one percent excess cost growth appears to be an upper bound for the economy as a whole when the projection horizon extends over the century, although some groups would experience declines in non-health consumption. More generally, the increase in health spending as a share of income may lead to a significant expansion of public sector financing, as has been the case historically. Extrapolation of historical trends also suggests that higher health spending will lead to insurance contracts with lower out-of-pocket payment shares, putting further upward pressure on health care expenditures.
INTRODUCTION
Long-run federal budget projections show large imbalances in coming decades owing to two factors: the aging of the population and the assumed rapid growth in percapita health care expenditures. For example, in its long-run projection, the Congressional Budget Office (2003) calculates that federal outlays for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid will rise from 6-1/2 percent of GDP in 2003 to 12-1/2 percent of GDP by 2050 if age-adjusted per capita health care costs rise with per capita GDP (reflecting a doubling of the elderly share of the population), 18 percent of GDP if health care costs rise 1 percent faster than per capita GDP growth and 28 percent of GDP if spending per enrollee rises 2-1/2 percent faster than per capita GDP.
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Over the past fifty years health care spending rose much more rapidly than GDP.
Eventually, health care spending growth will be limited to GDP growth because higher rates of growth would imply declines in investment needed to produce GDP. However, few believe that society would allow health care spending to reach this point, as it would imply that all consumption spending was devoted to health services. One criterion that has been proposed for the sustainability of health care spending growth is that increases in health care spending should not lead to absolute declines in real per capita non-health care consumption. This paper examines alternative paths for health care growth with this criterion from both a macroeconomic and a more microeconomic framework. It also addresses the types of adjustment in both the public and private provision of health insurance that will likely accompany increases in health spending.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we review the analysis of the 2000 Medicare Technical Review Panel, which first recommended that the Medicare Trustees assume that long-run age-adjusted per capita health care spending growth will exceed per capita GDP growth by 1 percentage point. This assumption is known as the 1 percent excess growth assumption. In the following section we simulate the level of consumption 1 Similar projections are found in Office of Management and Budget (2005) and the Congressional Budget Office (2005) and Gokhale and Smetters (2003). consistent with the Trustees' GDP projection, taking into account the reduction in investment needed when labor force growth slows and an assumed shift in the trade surplus to stabilize the current account deficit. We then project health consumption based on different rates of excess growth and determine the amount of resources remaining for non-health consumption. We find that 1 percent excess growth is sustainable, but higher rates are not sustainable because they imply real declines in nonhealth consumption.
The next section reports on the distribution of health spending by quintile among the elderly and non-elderly over the past thirty years. The key findings are as follows:
First, health spending is relatively flat across income groups, although the elderly spend significantly more than the non-elderly. Second, despite rapid increases in health spending over time, private health spending has been relatively constant as a share of income. This is explained by the fact that the public share of health spending has increased significantly over time, particularly among those with the lowest income.
Finally, out-of-pocket spending on health as a share of income has also remained relatively constant or even declined over time, as an increasing share of health expenses are covered by private insurance or the public sector.
We use these findings to project health spending over the next seventy-five years by income quintile and age group. We show that, holding the public share of spending constant, most groups will not experience absolute crowd-out of non-health consumption, in part, because of the large public component to financing. The exception is the lowincome elderly who are projected to have health demands equal to 460 percent of their income in 2080, and although 80 percent is projected to be financed by the public sector the remaining portion still will consume 86 percent of their income. We also examine the likely public responses to increased health spending. If public spending continues to rise in response to the increasing burden of health spending, budgetary pressures could be significantly greater than those projected in most baselines. We also do some back-ofthe-envelope calculations on the additional cost pressures that would arise if the trend toward lower out-of-pocket payments as a share of health spending were to continue. We show that, by 2080, health spending could be 12 percent higher than currently projected due to the lower cost-sharing assumption.
LONG-RUN HEALTH SPENDING PROJECTIONS
The 2000 Medicare Technical Review Panel recommended that the long-run projections for the Medicare Trust Funds be conditioned on the assumption that for the period from 25 to 75 years into the future, age-and gender-adjusted per beneficiary expenditures be assumed to grow 1 percentage point faster than per capita GDP growth. 2 Similar assumptions have been adopted by the Congressional Budget Office and Office of Management and Budget, but, because health care costs have generally risen more rapidly, higher projections for excess growth are also used often.
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The Technical Panel's rationale for its assumption was based on the estimated contribution that technological change has made to health care spending growth over the 1945 to 1998 period. Specifically, they attributed 50 percent of the 4.4 percent growth rate to technological change (p. 35 of the Report), generating 2.2 percent growth from technology. Subtracting off the Trustees 1.2 percent growth of real per capita GDP yields the 1 percent excess growth assumption. 4 The Panel assumed that all other factors that have contributed to excess growth historically, except for aging, will not contribute to growth in the future.
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The 2000 Technical Panel also cited sustainability criteria which the 1 percent excess growth assumption met. The key sustainability criterion was whether increased health spending could occur without a reduction in real non-health spending. 6 This definition of sustainability provides some useful guidance about the plausibility of the 2 After the seventy-fifth year the projections assume that age-adjusted health spending rises with GDP. rates, and compensation as a percent of GDP. The latter is assumed to be constant, consistent with the historical record and with a Cobb-Douglas production function.
We construct total personal consumption expenditures to be the residual of GDP less the sum of gross investment, government purchases, and net exports. The gross investment projection assumes that the real per-worker capital stock continues to rise at the historical rate, consistent with the Trustees assumption that labor productivity would increase at near its historical trend and that depreciation rates would remain at current 7 See Chernew, Hirth, and Cutler (2003) for a discussion of the concept of health affordability.
values. 8 We assume that government purchases are maintained at their 2004 share of GDP. The vast majority of nondefense government purchases of goods and services are for investment-like activities, ranging from construction of public infrastructure to education, and thus implicitly are part of the production function. 9 For the purposes of the simulation, we also assume that net exports rise over the coming fifteen years to post a small surplus that stabilizes the current account deficit at 2 percent of GDP, which in turn allows the ratio of net foreign debt to GDP to settle in at 47 percent.
10 Table 1 shows the results. The projected slowdown in labor force growth leads to a smaller share of GDP devoted to investment. However, the swing of the trade account about offsets the decline in investment and the share of GDP going to consumption is relatively constant. Nonetheless, consumption declines over the next fifteen years from 70 percent of GDP in 2004 to 68 percent of GDP by 2020 because the swing in the trade account necessary to stabilize net foreign indebtedness is assumed to be completed by that time. The swing in the trade account is greater than the decline in investment and consumption growth is below GDP growth over that period.
We project the share of consumption devoted to health spending by a two-step procedure. First, we allocate BEA's estimate of personal consumption expenditures on health in 2004 among three age groups (under twenty, aged 20 to 64, and 65 and over) using the population shares according to the Social Security Administration and the relative health spending intensities estimated by Lubitz, et. al. (2001) . Then, health spending was projected forward using the Social Security Trustees' 2005 population projection, GDP per capita, and selected assumptions about excess health care growth 8 The Trustees assumed that annual average labor productivity growth would be 1.6 percent per year compared with 1.6 percent over the 1966-2000 periods. We assume per-worker capital stock grows 1.2 percent per year, same as the previous 30 years. The average depreciation rate has tended to rise over time as capital accumulation has shifted towards shorter-lived assets; for these simulations, we assume this stabilizes. 9 In 2003, 83 percent of the goods and services purchased by the government were for national defense, public order and safety, health education and economic affairs (largely transportation and other public infrastructure). 10 The Trustees assume that the nominal interest rate is greater than the growth rate of the economy. Therefore, a trade account surplus is necessary to stabilize the ratio of the current account to GDP and the ratio of net foreign debt to GDP. We assume that the current account deficit is stabilized at 2 percent of GDP; alternative assumptions about the steady-state level of the current account deficit would have only a small effect on the trade account surplus. beginning in 2005. 11 Real health spending was calculated using the PCE deflator which was assumed to grow at the same rate as the GDP deflator.
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Our projections are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 
DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH CARE SPENDING AND SOURCES OF FINANCING
The assumption of 1 percent excess cost growth is feasible if the appropriate criterion to use for feasibility is that the average consumption of non-health goods and services will not decline over the next century. However, it is important to also examine 11 This methodology does not allow for changes in relative health care spending based on changes of the average age of the 65 and over group. 12 By using the PCE deflator we do not take a stand on the decomposition of health spending into real and changes in relative prices. The Trustees assume that the CPI deflator will rise 0.3 percentage point faster than the GDP deflator and the CPI has historically risen 0.4 percentage point faster than the PCE deflator. 13 With per capita consumption growth of 1.5 percent and 2 percent excess growth of health care then crowd-out begins when health care is 1.5/(1.5+2)= 43 percent of consumption. But during the next decade per capita consumption grows slower than per capita GDP and non-health consumption stagnates at a lower share of health.
whether such growth of non-health consumption will be feasible for different groups. As we showed above, the question of whether health spending will crowd out non-health spending depends on the initial share of health spending in consumption. If some groups have higher shares today, then, assuming that health spending growth is constant across the population, these groups will face absolute crowd-out sooner than the average.
To examine some of the microeconomic issues associated with the excess cost growth assumption, we use the various national medical expenditure surveys that have been conducted over the years. Specifically, we examine data from 1970, 1977, 1987, 1996, and 2002. 14 The implications of these findings are shown in Table 5 percent in 1970. These numbers suggest that excess health care cost growth will tend to cause crowd-out of non-health consumption much earlier for older and lower-income groups. But to determine crowd-out, it is important to concentrate on private health spending rather than total health spending. spending would lead to declines in non-health spending for groups with relatively high health costs. We began with the 2002 income and health spending data described above.
We projected the income of each quintile of elderly and non-elderly by increasing their income by the amount that real per capita GDP is projected to grow over the same period.
This assumes that the distribution of income does not change going forward, either across quintiles or between non-elderly and elderly and that per capita factor income grows at the same pace as overall GDP. 19 Our income measure also includes transfers and our methodology allows per capita transfers to the elderly to rise with GDP while under current law they would rise more slowly owing to the increase in the normal retirement age to 67 for social security benefits.
Health care spending is projected forward after making two adjustments to the 2002 data. First, we increase proportionately the health spending (maintaining the shares financed by public and private sectors) to bring the overall level up to the share in 19 Over the projection, factor income will likely grow more slowly than GDP reflecting the rising foreign indebtedness. The distribution of factor income between non-elderly and elderly may change if the relative returns to capital and labor change.
spending observed in the national accounts data. The micro data understate health spending because they do not include private or public administrative costs and profits and spending on institutionalized patients. Second, we altered the public/private spending shares for the elderly to capture the Medicare drug benefit. 20 By holding the public spending share of health care constant over the projection our simulation is broadly consistent with current law.
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Our results, displayed in Table 7 , suggest that, among the non-elderly, real nonhealth consumption will not be crowded out over the projection period, as real income after-private health spending will continue to grow. Low-income groups now only spend a small portion of their income on health because a large share of health spending is financed by the public sector. In 2080, when health care costs are projected to be 161 percent of income on average, only 54 percent of private income will be spent on health.
Among the elderly, we project a decline in real non-health income for the lowest quintile.
Although the public sector finances 81 percent of health care, the other 19 percent uses up nearly all income because health care costs are 461 percent of income for this group.
The second quintile also is near the point where non-health resources will decline.
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While only one of our ten quintiles will have declining non-health resources, subgroups among the quintiles may see declines relative to earlier generations, particularly families with persistent high health expenditures. Furthermore, our analysis does not account for the taxes that will be needed to finance the increased transfers for social security and health care. If these increased taxes are broadly based, then other quintiles may also see declines in the resources available to finance non-health spending. 20 Lacking good estimates on the overall impact (increased Medicare less decreased Medicaid) of the drug benefit by quintile we apportioned the drug benefit by observed drug spending. This resulted in a fairly even distribution of the benefit across quintiles with the lower two quintiles receiving 30 percent higher per capita benefit than the top two quintiles. With 90 percent take-up rates the basic benefit will be broadly distributed, we assume, in effect, that the low income subsidies will largely offset by reduced Medicaid payments. 21 Some features of current law, such as Medicaid income and asset tests may provide less coverage in the future while other features such as co-payments and relative shifts in demand toward covered services may provide more public coverage over time. 22 These results are similar to Johnson and Penner (2004) who project income, taxes and, medical costs through 2030.
PROJECTING PUBLIC SPENDING: IS THERE AN ENDOGENOUS RESPONSE TO HEALTH COST GROWTH?
One of the striking findings from the health spending data is that private spending on health care has not increased in tandem with total health spending. How did this happen? Table 8 shows that the public share of health spending has increased over time, particularly for the lower income quintiles. This increase may have been accomplished in a number of ways, including direct legislation that increased coverage for public health insurance, deductibles that haven't kept pace with health spending, expansions in outreach programs and reductions in stigma for low-income health programs, and increases in payments to public hospitals. Part of this increase in the share that is public may also represent higher spending growth in publicly-managed health insurance programs.
Regardless of the source, these data suggest that private spending and public spending grow at very different rates over time. Figure 2 shows how private and public spending diverged over time for the lowest income quintiles. The data suggest that as health spending increased as a share of income, the public share of spending increased to lower the burden of private health spending. This dynamic has also been apparent in the recent Medicare prescription drug bill. As reported in Table 6 , the share of private health spending in income has increased significantly faster than trend since 1996 for the elderly; this increase is due almost entirely to prescription drugs. Arguably as a result, political pressures arose that led to a significant expansion in public health care financing that will lower the burden of private health care spending over the coming decade.
Figure 3 provides a slightly more formal examination of the relationship between the burden of health spending and the public financing role. It plots the income share of total health spending by quintile over time against the share of that spending that was publicly financed, for elderly and non-elderly households, for the five years studied (1970, 1977, 1987, 1996, and 2002) . The relationship is clear--as health spending increases as a share of income, the public share of spending increases as well.
SIMULATING AN INCREASING PUBLIC ROLE IN HEALTH CARE FINANCING
It is unclear how to characterize the responsiveness of public health care financing. We choose two scenarios which we consider plausible. In the first scenario, we increase the public financing of health care so that the private share of income devoted to health care spending remains at its 2002 value through 2030. After 2030, we hold constant the new higher public portion of health spending and allow the private share of income devoted to health to rise. This policy is consistent with the fact that the private share of income devoted to health care spending has been roughly unchanged over the past 30 years because of increased public sector spending. We allow this to continue only to 2030 because at some point the private share of income devoted to health care will likely be allowed rise if growth of health continues to exceed that of income.
In the second scenario, we exploit the relation between the public portion of health care spending to health care as a share of income by quintile shown in Figure 3 .
We tried several regression strategies to capture the nonlinear response and settled on a piece-wise linear trend. 23 We use the regression results to predict the increase in the public share for each quintile as overall health spending by that quintile as a share of income rises in the future. Table 9 shows our estimates of the effects of these two policies on government spending. We project that federal and state and local spending on Medicare and These scenarios highlight the pressures for greater spending that may develop as health spending continues to grow. Of course, even under the current baseline, the public sector will face substantial budgetary pressures, so the actual response may be more attenuated.
Nonetheless, as the recent Medicare prescription drug legislation indicates, the demand for the public sector to mitigate the burden of health spending can be substantial even in the face of large future budgetary imbalances.
PROJECTING PRIVATE SPENDING: IS THERE AN ENDOGENOUS RESPONSE TO HEALTH COST GROWTH?
Another striking trend evident in the health spending data is the change in the share of health spending that is financed by out-of-pocket payments (direct payments by households for medical expenditures). Table 10 shows how this share has declined over time for all households. To some extent, this decline the out-of-pocket share reflects the increased public provision of health care (which may substitute for direct private payments for care), but it is equally apparent for those in the upper income quintiles who have little public provision of care. The net effect of these declines on the share of income that is spent on out-of-pocket payments is reported in Table 11. The table shows that, as a share of income, out-of-pocket payments for health care have been stable or declining, even as health spending has grown as a share of income.
It does not seem unreasonable that the demand for insurance should increase as health spending becomes a larger (and hence riskier) share of income. 25 Projections of future spending generally assume that this trend will not continue and that out of pocket payments will remain constant as a share of health spending. 26 An alternative assumption is that out-of-pocket spending will remain constant as a share of income. Under this assumption, shown in Table 12 , out of pocket spending will fall as a share of health expenditures, from about 20 percent on average today to 15 percent by 2020 and to 8 percent by 2080. This reduction in the out-of-pocket share acts like a reduction in the 25 On the other hand, it may also be that the overconsumption of health services induced by lower out-ofpocket payments may also increase with health spending. See Cutler and Zeckhauser (1999) for an overview of the optimal health insurance policy. 26 For example, the 2000 Medicare Trustees Technical Panel that first recommended the 1 percent excess cost growth assumption explicitly assumed that only technological growth would drive future health spending increases.
price of health services, since the out-of-pocket share is the price faced by consumers when they are choosing how much health care to consume. Using a demand elasticity of 0.2, these price reductions imply increased health spending of 5 percent by 2020 and 12 percent by 2080.
CONCLUSION
The Medicare Trustees now assume that age-adjusted per capita health care
spending will slow to a rate of growth 1 percentage point faster than per capita GDP growth. Our analysis suggests that this rate of growth is at the upper end of the range consistent with the criterion of no decline in per capita non-health consumption as faster rates of growth for health care imply declines in non-health consumption for the population in general. Long-run budget projections using higher growth rates may overstate the probable budget pressures from health care costs. With 1 percent excess growth some subsets of the overall population may experience declines in real non-health consumption, particularly low-income elderly. Furthermore, the share of income devoted to private health spending has been remarkably stable over the past 30 years, accommodated by increased public health care financing. This finding suggests that demands for increased public sector financing will occur well before health spending reaches the level at which it crowds-out the growth of non-health spending. It remains to be seen how the competing pressures of higher taxes vs. higher private health care spending will be balanced. Similarly, induced demand from falling out-of-pocket payments may also put upward pressure on health spending and public-sector financing.
With 1 percent excess growth, the elderly may have health care expenses that average 80 percent of income (including non-health transfers) by 2055, of which 70 percent would be financed by the public sector under current law. The rise in health care as a share of consumption implies that an increasing share of lifetime consumption will be spent on health care during retirement. Policy discussions have largely focused on ways to reduce transfers to the elderly relative to current law, but should be broadened to include ways to increase saving during working years to finance health care during retirement.
Our analysis does not account for the changes in taxes that will be required to finance the transfers implied in our baseline projection. Further work should examine the projected evolution of after-tax income as well as modeling changes in the distribution of income among elderly and non-elderly. 
